Labels: 1991 Paris Peace Accords, Paris Peace Agreement

It didn’t turn out that way. Cambodia today is essentially ruled by a single political party with little room for an opposition, has a weak and corrupt judiciary, and the country’s most effective union leaders have been murdered.

That wasn’t the scenario envisioned in Paris. Now, just as 20th anniversary commemorations are approaching, one of the few groups still enjoying the freedoms created under the peace accords are about to be silenced. The government of Cambodia is poised to enact a law that will effectively hamstring the country’s lively civil society and NGOs, among the last independent voices in Cambodia.

In Paris, the framework for Cambodia’s democracy was a much debated element of the peace accords. That debate led to Cambodia’s Constitution and its guarantee of freedom of association and speech. The proposed law on civil society would deprive these independent Cambodian groups of those rights and undermine much of their work representing the country’s most vulnerable citizens — advocating for their rights and dispensing aid, largely paid for with foreign donations. Most recently, these civil society groups exposed the government’s eviction of the poor from valuable land in Phnom Penh. As a result, the World Bank is suspending all new loans to Cambodia until those made homeless receive proper housing.

Under the new law, these independent citizen groups would have to register with the government and win approval to operate under vague criteria; if the government disapproves of a group’s behavior it can dissolve it using equally vague criteria. There would be no right of appeal.

The normally fractious Cambodian civil groups have joined together against the new law and asked the government for serious amendments to protect basic constitutional rights. They were rejected and only superficial changes were made. With little time left, one of their NGO leaders made an emergency trip to Washington to meet with international organizations, foreign embassies and the U.S. government, asking them to speak out loudly against the measure before it passes in the coming weeks.

“If this law is passed we will be silenced. Foreign donors will give us less money. The people who will suffer are the poor,” said Borithy Lun, the head of the Cooperation Committee for Cambodia. He led a meeting at the offices of Oxfam America, where I am a member of the board of directors. The law would diminish the ability of international NGOs, like Oxfam, to help the poor in Cambodia as well, since it requires all foreign nonprofit organizations to work directly with official agencies, essentially becoming an arm of the government.

All of this will have a direct impact on Cambodia’s impressive economic gains. Foreign businesses have come to rely on Cambodia’s civil society groups to act as honest brokers, pointing out the pitfalls in an economy marked by corruption and weak law enforcement. Foreign governments and institutions have already warned the Cambodian government that if the proposed civil society law is passed, they will rethink the $1 billion in aid given to Cambodia every year, which is roughly half of the country’s budget. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has spoken up repeatedly in favor of strong, independent civil societies and Cambodia has made no secret of its desire to continue improving relations with the United States.

As the commemorations of the Paris peace accords begin, with more champagne and seminars, instead of looking backward to past glory, it might be better to focus on today and reinforce the accords. Countries that are rightfully proud of their role in bringing peace to Cambodia are in a good position to require preserving the independence of civil society when Cambodia comes asking for their votes at the United Nations this fall.

The Cambodian government has two big objectives: It wants to win one of the nonpermanent seats on the United Nations Security Council, and to get the United Nations to help resolve the Thai-Cambodia border dispute centered on the temple of Preah Vihear. Cambodia has dispatched senior diplomats to countries large and small to win their votes and has initiated border talks with the government of the new Thai prime minister, Yingluck Shinawatra. The price for greater influence and prestige in the world should be reinforcing democracy, not diminishing it.

Elizabeth Becker is a former New York Times correspondent and author of “When the War Was Over,” a history of Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge.

Labels: 1991 Paris Peace Accords, Prime Minister Hun Sen

Labels: 1991 Paris Peace Accords, Canadian MP Alexandra Mendes, Sam Rainsy, Sam Rainsy Party

Labels: 1991 Paris Peace Accords, Prime Minister Hun Sen, Sam Rainsy Party

Labels: 1991 Paris Peace Accords, Cambodia Parliament, Paris Peace Agreement, Prime Minister Hun Sen, Sam Rainsy Party

APPEAL FROM PARLIAMENTARIANS
FOR THE REACTIVATION OF THE PARIS AGREEMENTS ON CAMBODIA

A written statement by Amnesty International to the 15th Session of the UN Human Rights Council in September 2010 says, “the systemic lack of protection of human rights in Cambodia arises from long-standing impunity for human rights violations [and] very serious shortcomings in the rule of law. The legal system remains biased against the poor and marginalized. Forced evictions continue to affect thousands of families, predominantly people living in poverty. Actions in the courts [initiated by the government] against housing rights defenders, journalists and other critical voices stifle freedom of expression. Amnesty International strongly calls for an end to the “ongoing serious human rights violations” in Cambodia.

Amnesty International’s observations are corroborated by reports from Professor Surya Subedi, the UN Special Rapporteur for the situation of human rights in Cambodia. In his last annual report to the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva last month, the UN Envoy deplores that victims of all sorts of abuses in Cambodia seem to be “desperate for justice,” and is “concerned about the narrowing of political space in the country for people belonging to the opposition political parties and other political activists.”

On the same topic and in the same period of time, a coalition of sixteen best-known local NGOs denounces a recent series of “political trials” and rings the alarm bell by stressing that Cambodia is at risk of becoming a “de-facto one-party state” as during war time.

Nineteen years ago, in order to put an end to war and massacres and to help in the reconstruction of Cambodia, the international community, under the aegis of the United Nations, brought all Cambodian factions together so as to achieve national reconciliation and to lay the foundations of a system of liberal democracy, on the basis of pluralism. It is this type of political system that the international community accepted to guarantee for Cambodia by signing the Paris Agreements on October 23, 1991.

In effect, the Paris Agreements guarantee that “all persons in Cambodia shall enjoy the rights and freedoms embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (Article 3 of the Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia). Their signatories represented by eighteen friendly countries including all Western powers and also Australia and Japan, “undertake to promote and encourage respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cambodia” (Article 15 of the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict). Besides, important Annexes to that Agreement legally bind Cambodia to “a system of liberal democracy, on the basis of pluralism”. The official texts more specifically promise the Cambodian people the respect for “fundamental rights ”, “an independent judiciary”, “due process et equality before the law”, “protection from arbitrary deprivation of property” and “periodic and genuine elections ”, but all these fundamental elements of democracy have not materialized, which explains the current authoritarian, if not totalitarian, drift.

In order to put the democratization process back on track and to strengthen the mechanisms designed to protect human rights in Cambodia as enshrined in the Paris Agreements, the governments of signatory countries and donor institutions such as the European Commission must immediately take adequate measures to ensure the effective respect for all the relevant provisions of the Agreements,

Guided by the desire to help consolidate democracy in Cambodia and to help this country achieve a harmonious and sustainable development on the basis of sound political foundations, the elected representatives from the Cambodian democratic opposition (**) and parliamentarians from friendly nations (***) together launch this Appeal for the reactivation of the 1991 Paris Agreements on Cambodia. They are doing it on the eve of the 19th anniversary of the historical signing of the Agreements, which is the coming 23rd day of October.

-------------------
(*) Full text of the Agreements at http://tinyurl.com/24558zn
(**) 26 Cambodian National Assembly members and 2 Cambodian Senators from the Sam Rainsy Party initiated this Appeal.
(***) Parliamentarians from friendly countries who want to express their solidarity and support, please simply send your names to samrainsysrp@gmail.com. Thank you.

==========================

23 octobre 2010 : Commémoration du 19ème anniversaire de la signature des Accords de Paris de 1991 sur le Cambodge.

A tous les Cambodgiens d’Outre-mer et à tous les Amis du Cambodge : Prière d’envoyer l’Appel ci-dessous à vos représentants élus (Députés et Sénateurs) dans votre pays de résidence.

APPEL DE PARLEMENTAIRES
A LA REACTIVATION DES ACCORDS DE PARIS SUR LE CAMBODGE

Une inquiétante dérive autoritaire se manifeste au Cambodge depuis plusieurs années. Elle se caractérise par une détérioration de la situation des droits l’homme, un étouffement des libertés fondamentales, une politique brutale de confiscation de terres qui touche surtout la masse des pauvres, la suppression de toutes formes de critique et contestation , la persécution de l’opposition parlementaire et des militants de la société civile, l’utilisation du pouvoir judiciaire à des fins politiques et un glissement vers un système de parti unique.

Ainsi, on peut lire dans une déclaration d’Amnesty International à la 15 ème session du Conseil des droits de l’homme en septembre 2010 : “La déficience systématique en matière de protection des droits de l’homme au Cambodge tient à l’impunité de longue date pour les violations des droits de l’homme [et] aux très graves manquements à l’état de droit. Le système judiciaire reste biaisé à l’encontre des pauvres et des marginalisés. Les expropriations par la force continuent de toucher des milliers de familles, essentiellement des gens vivant dans la pauvreté. Les actions en justice [intentées par le gouvernement] contre ceux qui prennent la défense des spoliés, les journalistes et d’autres voix critiques, tendent à étouffer la liberté d’expression”. Amnesty International demande que des mesures soient prises pour que cessent ces “sérieuses et persistantes violations des droits de l’homme” au Cambodge.

Les constatations de Amnesty International sont corroborées par le Rapporteur spécial des Nations unies pour la situation des droits de l’homme au Cambodge, M. Surya Su bédi. Celui-ci, dans son dernier rapport au Conseil des droits de l’homme le mois dernier à Genève, constate que les victimes d’abus de toutes sortes sont “désespérées de la justice”, et se dit “préoccupé par le rétrécissement de l’espace politique pour les partis d’opposition et d’autres militants [des droits civiques]”.

Dans le même ordre d’idée et durant la même période, une coalition de seize ONG locales les plus connues dénonce la récente série de “procès politiques” frappant des dirigeants de l’opposition, et tire la sonnette d’alarme: le Cambodge est en train de revenir en fait à un “système de parti unique” comme au temps de la guerre.

Pourtant, il y a dix-neuf ans, afin de mettre fin à la guerre et aux massacres et aider à la reconstruction du Cambodge, la communauté internationale, sous l’égide des Nations unies, avait amené toutes les factions cambodgiennes à se réconcilier et à jeter les bases d’une démocratie libérale pluraliste dont elle garantit le respect par la signature des Accords des Paris le 23 octobre 1991 (*).

En effet, les Accords de Paris garantissent que “toutes les personnes se trouvant au Cambodge jouiront des droits et libertés formulés par la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme” (Article 3 de l’Accord relatif à la souveraineté, l'indépendance, l'intégrité et l'inviolabilité territoriales, la neutralité et l'unité nationale du Cambodge). Leurs signataires composés de dix-huit pays amis incluant toutes les puissances occidentales ainsi que l’Australie et le Japon, “s'engagent à promouvoir et encourager le respect et l'exercice des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales” (Article 15 de l‘Accord pour un règlement politique global du conflit du Cambodge). Par ailleurs, des annexes importantes au même Accord prévoient bien pour le Cambodge “un système de démocratie libérale, fondé sur le pluralisme”. Les textes promettent plus spécifiquement aux Cambodgiens le respect des “droits fondamentaux”, “un pouvoir judiciaire indépendant”, “le droit à un procès équitable et l’égalité devant la loi”, la “protection contre la dépossession arbitraire” et des “élections périodiques et authentiques”, autant d‘éléments dont la non-concrétisation explique la dérive autoritaire, pour ne pas dire totalitaire, du pouvoir actuel.

Pour remettre sur les rails le processus de démocratisation et renforcer les dispositifs de défense des droits de l’homme au Cambodge figurant dans les Accords de Paris, les gouvernements des pays signataires et les institutions pourvoyeuses d’aide comme la Commission Européenne doivent prendre immédiatement les mesures nécessaires pour assurer le respect effectif de toutes les clauses essentielles de ces Accords.

C’est dans le but de consolider la démocratie au Cambodge et aider ce pays à se développer harmonieusement et durablement sur des bases saines que les élus de l’opposition démocratique cambodgienne (**) et des parlementaires de nations amies (***) lancent cet Appel à la réactivation des Accords de Paris de 1991 sur le Cambodge, et cela à la veille du dix-neuvième anniversaire de leur signature, le 23 octobre prochain.

-------------------

(*) Texte intégral des Accords sur le site http://tinyurl.com/2ua2awb
(**) 26 députés et 2 sénateurs cambodgiens du Parti Sam Rainsy ont initié cet Appel.
(***) Nous demandons aux parlementaires des pays amis du Cambodge qui désirent exprimer leur solidarité et leur soutien de bien vouloir simplement envoyer leur nom à samrainsysrp@gmail.com. Nous les en remercions vivement à l’avance.

[caption id="attachment_22602" align="alignleft" width="305" caption="ប្រធាន​គណបក្ស​សមរង្ស៊ី លោក សម រង្ស៊ី (RFA/Ayuthyea)"][/caption]

Labels: 1991 Paris Peace Accords, Sam Rainsy, Sam Rainsy Party

Paris, October 23, 1991

Annex 1 UNTAC Mandate

Section A General Procedures

1. In accordance with Article 6 of the Agreement, UNTAC will exercise the powers necessary to ensure the implementation of this Agreement, including those relating to the organisation and conduct of free and fair elections and the relevant aspects of the administration of Cambodia.
2. The following mechanism will be used to resolve all issues relating to the implementation of this Agreement which may arise between the Secretary-General's Special Representative and the Supreme National Council (SNC):
   
   a) The SNC offers advice to UNTAC, which will comply with this advice provided there is a consensus among the members of the SNC and provided this advice is consistent with the objectives of the present Agreement;
   
   b) If there is no consensus among the members of the SNC despite every endeavour of its President, H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, the President will be entitled to make the decision on what advice to offer to UNTAC, taking fully into account the views expressed in the SNC. UNTAC will comply with the advice provided it is consistent with the objectives of the present Agreement;
   
   c) If H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, President of the SNC, the legitimate representative of Cambodian sovereignty, is not, for whatever reason, in a position to make such a decision, his power of decision will transfer to the Secretary-General's Special Representative. The Special Representative will make the final decision, taking fully into account the views expressed in the SNC;
   
   d) Any power to act regarding the implementation of this Agreement conferred upon the SNC by the Agreement will be exercised by consensus or, failing such consensus, by its President in accordance with the procedure set out above. In the event that H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, President of the SNC, the legitimate representative of Cambodian sovereignty, is not, for whatever reason, in a position to act, his power to act will transfer to the Secretary-General's Special Representative, who may take the necessary action;
   
   e) In all cases, the Secretary-General's Special Representative will determine whether advice or action of the SNC is consistent with the present Agreement.
3. The Secretary-General's Special Representative or his delegate will attend the meetings of the SNC and of any subsidiary body which might be established by it and give its members all necessary information on the decisions taken by UNTAC.

Section B Civil Administration

1. In accordance with Article 6 of the Agreement, all administrative agencies, bodies and offices acting in the field of foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security and information will be placed under the direct control of UNTAC, which will exercise it as necessary to ensure strict neutrality. In this respect, the Secretary-General's Special Representative will determine what is necessary and may issue directives to the above-mentioned administrative agencies, bodies and offices. Such directives may be issued to and will bind all Cambodian Parties.
2. In accordance with Article 6 of the Agreement, the Secretary-General's Special Representative, in consultation with the SNC, will determine which other administrative agencies, bodies and offices could directly influence the outcome of elections. These administrative agencies, bodies and offices will be placed under direct supervision or control of UNTAC and will comply with any guidance provided by it.
3. In accordance with Article 6 of the Agreement, the Secretary-General's Special Representative, in consultation with the SNC, will identify which administrative agencies, bodies and offices could continue to operate in order to ensure normal day-to-day life in Cambodia, if necessary, under such supervision by UNTAC as it considers necessary.
4. In accordance with Article 6 of the Agreement, the authority of the Secretary-General's Special Representative will include the power to:
   
   a) Install in administrative agencies, bodies and offices of all the Cambodian Parties United Nations personnel, who will have unrestricted access to all administrative operations and information;
   
   b) Require the reassignment or removal of any personnel of such administrative agencies, bodies and offices.
5. a) On the basis of the information provided in Article I, paragraph 3, of annex 2, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General will determine, after consultation with the Cambodian Parties, those civil police necessary to perform law enforcement in Cambodia. All Cambodian Parties hereby undertake to comply with the determination made by the Special Representative in this regard;
   
   b) All civil police will operate under UNTAC supervision or control, in order to ensure that law and order are maintained effectively and impartially, and that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully protected. In consultation with the SNC, UNTAC will supervise other law enforcement and judicial processes throughout Cambodia to the extent necessary to ensure the attainment of these objectives.
6. If the Secretary-General's Special Representative deems it necessary, UNTAC, in consultation with the SNC, will undertake investigations of complaints and allegations regarding actions by the existing administrative structures in Cambodia that are inconsistent with or work against the objectives of this comprehensive political settlement. UNTAC will also be empowered to undertake such investigation on its own initiative. UNTAC will take, when necessary, appropriate corrective steps.

Section C Military Functions

1. UNTAC will supervise, monitor and verify the withdrawal of foreign forces, the ceasefire and related measures in accordance with annex 2, including:
   
   a) Verification of the withdrawal from Cambodia of all categories of foreign forces, advisers and military personnel and their weapons, ammunition and equipment, and their non-return to Cambodia
   
   b) Liaison with neighbouring Governments over any developments in or near their territory that could endanger the implementation of this Agreement;
   
   c) Monitoring the cessation of outside military assistance to all Cambodian Parties;
   
   d) Locating and confiscating caches of weapons and military supplies throughout the country;
   
   e) Assisting with clearing mines and undertaking training programmes in mine clearance and a mine awareness programme among the Cambodian people.
2. UNTAC will supervise the regrouping and relocating of all forces to specifically designated cantonment areas on the basis of an operational timetable to be agreed upon, in accordance with annex 2.
3. As the forces enter the cantonments, UNTAC will initiate the process of arms control and reduction specified in annex 2.
4. UNTAC will take necessary steps regarding the phased process of demobilisation of the military forces of the parties, in accordance with annex 2.
5. UNTAC will assist, as necessary, the International Committee of the Red Cross in the release of all prisoners of war and civilian internees.

Section D Elections

1. UNTAC will organise and conduct the election referred to in Part II of this Agreement in accordance with this section and annex 3.
2. UNTAC may consult with the SNC regarding the organisation and conduct of the electoral process.
3. In the exercise of its responsibilities in relation to the electoral process, the specific authority of UNTAC will include the following:
   
   a) The establishment, in consultation with the SNC, of a system of laws, procedures and administrative measures necessary for the holding of a free and fair election in Cambodia, including the adoption of an electoral law and of a code of conduct regulating participation in the election in a manner consistent with respect for human rights and prohibiting coercion or financial inducement in order to influence voter preference;
   
   b) The suspension or abrogation, in consultation with the SNC, of provisions of existing laws which could defeat the objects and purposes of this Agreement;
   
   c) The design and implementation of a voter education programme, covering all aspects of the election, to support the election process;
   
   d) The design and implementation of a system of voter registration, as a first phase of the electoral process, to ensure that eligible voters have the opportunity to register, and the subsequent preparation of verified voter registration lists;
   
   e) The design and implementation of a system of registration of political parties and lists of candidates;
   
   f) Ensuring fair access to the media, including press, television and radio, for all political parties contesting in the election;
   
   g) The adoption and implementation of measures to monitor and facilitate the participation of Cambodians in the elections, the political campaign and the balloting procedures;
   
   h) The design and implementation of a system of balloting and polling, to ensure that registered voters have the opportunity to vote;
   
   i) The establishment, in consultation with the SNC, of co-ordinated arrangements to facilitate the presence of foreign observers wishing to observe the campaign and voting;
   
   j) Overall direction of polling and the vote count;
   
   k) The identification and investigation of complaints of electoral irregularities, and the taking of appropriate corrective action;
   
   l) Determining whether or not the election was free and fair and, if so, certification of the list of persons duly elected.
4. In carrying out its responsibilities under the present section, UNTAC will establish a system of safeguards to assist it in ensuring the absence of fraud during the electoral process, including arrangements for Cambodian representatives to observe the registration and polling procedures and the provision of an UNTAC mechanism for hearing and deciding complaints.
5. The timetable for the various phases of the electoral process will be determined by UNTAC, in consultation with the SNC as provided in paragraph 2 of this section. The duration of the electoral process will not exceed nine months from the commencement of voter registration.
6. In organising and conducting the electoral process, UNTAC will make every effort to ensure that the system and procedures adopted are absolutely impartial, while the operational arrangements are as administratively simple and efficient as possible.

Section E Human Rights

In accordance with Article 16, UNTAC will make provisions for:

a) The development and implementation of a programme of human rights education to promote respect for and understanding of human rights;

b) General human rights oversight during the transitional period;

c) The investigation of human rights complaints, and, where appropriate, corrective action.

Annex 2 Withdrawal, Ceasefire and Related Measures

Article I Ceasefire

1. All Cambodian Parties (hereinafter referred to as “the Parties”) agree to observe a comprehensive ceasefire on land and water and in the air. This ceasefire will be implemented in two phases. During the first phase, the ceasefire will be observed with the assistance of the Secretary-General of the United Nations through his good offices. During the second phase, which should commence as soon as possible, the ceasefire will be supervised, monitored and verified by UNTAC. The Commander of the military component of UNTAC, in consultation with the Parties, shall determine the exact time and date at which the second phase will commence. This date will be set at least four weeks in advance of its coming into effect.
2. The Parties undertake that, upon the signing of this Agreement, they will observe a ceasefire and will order their armed forces immediately to disengage and refrain from all hostilities and any deployment, movement or action that would extend the territory they control or that might lead to a resumption of fighting, pending the commencement of the second phase. “Forces” are agreed to include all regular, provincial, district, paramilitary and other auxiliary forces.
   
   During the first phase, the Secretary-General of the United Nations will provide his good offices to the Parties to assist them in its observance. The Parties undertake to co-operate with the Secretary-General or his representatives in the exercise of his good offices in this regard.
3. The Parties agree that, immediately upon the signing of this Agreement, the following information will be provided to the United Nations:
   
   a) Total strength of their forces, organisation, precise number and location of deployments inside and outside Cambodia. The deployment will be depicted on a map marked with locations of all troop positions, occupied or unoccupied, including staging camps, supply bases and supply routes;
   
   b) Comprehensive lists of arms, ammunition and equipment held by their forces, and the exact locations at which those arms, ammunition and equipment are deployed;
   
   c) Detailed record of their minefields, including types and characteristics of mines laid and information of booby traps used by them together with any information available to them about minefields laid or booby traps used by the other Parties;
   
   d) Total strength of their police forces, organisation, precise numbers and locations of deployments as well as comprehensive lists of their arms, ammunition and equipment and the exact locations at which those arms, ammunition and equipment are deployed.
4. Immediately upon his arrival in Cambodia, and not later than four weeks before the beginning of the second phase, the Commander of the military component of UNTAC will, in consultation with the Parties, finalise UNTAC's plan for the regroupment and cantonment of the forces of the Parties and for the storage of their arms, ammunition and equipment, in accordance with Article Ill of this annex. This plan will include the designation of regroupment and cantonment areas, as well as an agreed timetable. The cantonment areas will be established at battalion size or larger.
5. The Parties agree to take steps to inform their forces at least two weeks before the beginning of the second phase, using all possible means of communication, about the agreed date and time of the beginning of the second phase, about the agreed plan for the regroupment and cantonment of their forces and for the storage of their arms, ammunition and equipment and, in particular, about the exact locations of the regroupment areas to which their forces are to report. Such information will continue to be disseminated for a period of four weeks after the beginning of the second phase.
6. The Parties shall scrupulously observe the ceasefire and will not resume any hostilities by land, water or air. The commanders of their armed forces will ensure that all troops under their command remain on their respective positions, pending their movement to the designated regroupment areas, and refrain from all hostilities and from any deployment or movement or action which would extend the territory they control or which might lead to a resumption of fighting.

Article II Liaison System and Mixed Military Working Group

A Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG) will be established with a view to resolving any problems that may arise in the observance of the ceasefire. It will be chaired by the most senior United Nations military officer in Cambodia or his representative. Each Party agrees to designate an officer of the rank of brigadier or equivalent to serve on the MMWG. Its composition, method of operation and meeting places will be determined by the most senior United Nations military officer in consultation with the Parties. Similar liaison arrangements will be made at lower military command levels to resolve practical problems on the ground.

Article III Regroupment and cantonment of the forces of the Parties and storage of their arms, ammunition and equipment

1. In accordance with the operational timetable referred to in paragraph 4 of Article I of the present annex, all forces of the Parties that are not already in designated cantonment areas will report to designated regroupment areas, which will be established and operated by the military component of UNTAC. These regroupment areas will be established and operational not later than one week prior to the date of the beginning of the second phase. The Parties agree to arrange for all their forces, with all their arms, ammunition and equipment, to report to regroupment areas within two weeks after the beginning of the second phase. All personnel who have reported to the regroupment areas will thereafter be escorted by personnel of the military component of UNTAC, with their arms, ammunition and equipment, to designated cantonment areas. All Parties agree to ensure that personnel reporting to the regroupment areas will be able to do so in full safety and without any hindrance.
2. On the basis of the information provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article I of the present annex, UNTAC will confirm that the regroupment and cantonment processes have been completed in accordance with the plan referred to in paragraph 4 of Article I of this annex. UNTAC will endeavour to complete these processes within four weeks from the date of the beginning of the second phase. On the completion of regroupment of all forces and of their movement to cantonment areas, respectively, the Commander of the military component of UNTAC will so inform each of the four Parties.
3. The Parties agree that, as their forces enter the designated cantonment areas, their personnel will be instructed by their commanders to immediately hand over all their arms, ammunition and equipment to UNTAC for storage in the custody of UNTAC.
4. UNTAC will check the arms, ammunition and equipment handed over to it against the lists referred to in paragraph 3. b) of Article I of this annex, in order to verify that all the arms, ammunition and equipment in the possession of the Parties have been placed under its custody.

Article IV Resupply of forces during cantonment

The military component of UNTAC will supervise the resupply of all forces of the Parties during the regroupment and cantonment processes. Such resupply will be confined to items of a non-lethal nature such as food, water, clothing and medical supplies as well as provision of medical care.

Article V Ultimate disposition of the forces of the Parties and of their arms, ammunition and equipment

1. In order to reinforce the objectives of a comprehensive political settlement, minimise the risks of a return to warfare, stabilise the security situation and build confidence among the Parties to the conflict, all Parties agree to undertake a phased and balanced process of demobilisation of at least 70 per cent of their military forces. This process shall be undertaken in accordance with a detailed plan to be drawn up by UNTAC on the basis of the information provided under Article I of this annex and in consultation with the Parties. It should be completed prior to the end of the process of registration for the elections and on a date to be determined by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.
2. The Cambodian Parties hereby commit themselves to demobilise all their remaining forces before or shortly after the elections and, to the extent that full demobilisation is unattainable, to respect and abide by whatever decision the newly elected government that emerges in accordance with Article 12 of this Agreement takes with regard to the incorporation of parts or all of those forces into a new national army. Upon completion of the demobilisation referred to in paragraph 1, the Cambodian Parties and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General shall undertake a review regarding the final disposition of the forces remaining in the cantonments, with a view to determining which of the following shall apply:
   
   a) If the Parties agree to proceed with the demobilisation of all or some of the forces remaining in the cantonments, preferably prior to or otherwise shortly after the elections, the Special Representative shall prepare a timetable for so doing, in consultation with them;
   
   b) Should total demobilisation of all of the residual forces before or shortly after the elections not be possible, the Parties hereby undertake to make available all of their forces remaining in cantonments to the newly elected government that emerges in accordance with Article 12 of this Agreement, for consideration for incorporation into a new national army. They further agree that any such forces which are not incorporated into the new national army will be demobilised forthwith according to a plan to be prepared by the Special Representative. With regard to the ultimate disposition of the remaining forces and all the arms, ammunition and equipment, UNTAC, as it withdraws from Cambodia, shall retain such authority as is necessary to ensure an orderly transfer to the newly elected government of those responsibilities it has exercised during the transitional period.
3. UNTAC will assist, as required, with the reintegration into civilian life of the forces demobilised prior to the elections.
4. a) UNTAC will control and guard all the arms, ammunition and equipment of the Parties throughout the transitional period;
   
   b) As the cantoned forces are demobilised in accordance with paragraph 1 above, there will be a parallel reduction by UNTAC of the arms, ammunition and equipment stored on site in the cantonment areas. For the forces remaining in the cantonment areas, access to their arms, ammunition and equipment shall only be on the basis of the explicit authorisation of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;
   
   c) If there is a further demobilisation of the military forces in accordance with paragraph 2. a) above, there will be a commensurate reduction by UNTAC of the arms, ammunition and equipment stored on site in the cantonment areas;
   
   d) The ultimate disposition of all arms, ammunition and equipment will be determined by the government that emerges through the free and fair elections in accordance with Article 12 of this Agreement.

Article VI Verification of withdrawal from Cambodia and non-return of all categories of foreign forces

1. UNTAC shall be provided, no later than two weeks before the commencement of the second phase of the ceasefire, with detailed information in writing regarding the withdrawal of foreign forces. This information shall include the following elements:
   
   a) Total strength of these forces and their organisation and deployment;
   
   b) Comprehensive lists of arms, ammunition and equipment held by these forces, and their exact locations;
   
   c) Withdrawal plan (already implemented or to be implemented), including withdrawal routes, border crossing points and time of departure from Cambodia.
2. On the basis of the information provided in accordance with paragraph 1 above, UNTAC will undertake an investigation in the manner it deems appropriate. The Party providing the information will be required to make personnel available to accompany UNTAC investigators.
3. Upon confirmation of the presence of any foreign forces, UNTAC will immediately deploy military personnel with the foreign forces and accompany them until they have withdrawn from Cambodian territory. UNTAC will also establish checkpoints on withdrawal routes, border crossing points and airfields to verify the withdrawal and ensure the non-return of all categories of foreign forces.
4. The Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG) provided for in Article II of this annex will assist UNTAC in fulfilling the above-mentioned tasks.

Article VII Cessation of outside military assistance to all Cambodian Parties

1. All Parties undertake, from the time of the signing of this Agreement, not to obtain or seek any outside military assistance, including weapons, ammunition and military equipment from outside sources.
2. The Signatories whose territory is adjacent to Cambodia, namely, the Governments of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Kingdom of Thailand and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, undertake to:
   
   a) Prevent the territories of their respective States, including land territory, territorial sea and air space, from being used for the purpose of providing any form of military assistance to any of the Cambodian Parties. Resupply of such items as food, water, clothing and medical supplies through their territories will be allowed, but shall, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-paragraph c) below, be subject to UNTAC supervision upon arrival in Cambodia;
   
   b) Provide written confirmation to the Commander of the military component of UNTAC, not later than four weeks after the second phase of the ceasefire begins, that no forces, arms, ammunition or military equipment of any of the Cambodian Parties are present on their territories;
   
   c) Receive an UNTAC liaison officer in each of their capitals and designate an officer of the rank of colonel or equivalent, not later than four weeks after the beginning of the second phase of the ceasefire, in order to assist UNTAC in investigating, with due respect for their sovereignty, any complaints that activities are taking place on their territories that are contrary to the provisions of the comprehensive political settlement.
3. To enable UNTAC to monitor the cessation of outside assistance to all Cambodian Parties, the Parties agree that, upon signature of this Agreement, they will provide to UNTAC any information available to them about the routes and means by which military assistance, including weapons, ammunition and military equipment, have been supplied to any of the Parties. Immediately after the second phase of the ceasefire begins, UNTAC will take the following practical measures:
   
   a) Establish checkpoints along the routes and at selected locations along the Cambodian side of the border and at airfields inside Cambodia;
   
   b) Patrol the coastal and inland waterways of Cambodia;
   
   c) Maintain mobile teams at strategic locations within Cambodia to patrol and investigate allegations of supply of arms to any of the Parties.

Article VIII Caches of weapons and military supplies

1. In order to stabilise the security situation, build confidence and reduce arms and military supplies throughout Cambodia, each Party agrees to provide to the Commander of the military component of UNTAC, before a date to be determined by him, all information at its disposal, including marked maps, about known or Suspected caches of weapons and military supplies throughout Cambodia.
2. On the basis of information received, the military component of UNTAC shall, after the date referred to in paragraph 1, deploy verification teams to investigate each report and destroy each cache found.

Article IX Unexploded ordnance devices

1. Soon after arrival in Cambodia, the military component of UNTAC shall ensure, as a first step, that all known minefields are clearly marked.
2. The Parties agree that, after completion of the regroupment and cantonment processes in accordance with Article Ill of the present annex, they will make available mine-clearing teams which, under the supervision and control of UNTAC military personnel, will leave the cantonment areas in order to assist in removing, disarming or deactivating remaining unexploded ordnance devices. Those mines or objects which cannot be removed, disarmed or deactivated will be clearly marked in accordance with a system to be devised by the military component of UNTAC.
3. UNTAC shall:
   
   a) Conduct a mass public education programme in the recognition and avoidance of explosive devices;
   
   b) Train Cambodian volunteers to dispose of unexploded ordnance devices;
   
   c) Provide emergency first-aid training to Cambodian volunteers.

Article X Investigation of violations

1. After the beginning of the second phase, upon receipt of any information or complaint from one of the Parties relating to a possible case of non-compliance with any of the provisions of the present annex or related provisions, UNTAC will undertake an investigation in the manner which it deems appropriate. Where the investigation takes place in response to a complaint by one of the Parties, that Party will be required to make personnel available to accompany the UNTAC investigators. The results of such investigation will be conveyed by UNTAC to the complaining Party and the Party complained against, and if necessary to the SNC.
2. UNTAC will also carry out investigations on its own initiative in other cases when it has reason to believe or suspect that a violation of this annex or related provisions may be taking place.

Article XI Release of prisoners of war

The military component of UNTAC will provide assistance as required to the International Committee of the Red Cross in the latter's discharge of its functions relating to the release of prisoners of war.

Article XII Repatriation and resettlement of displaced Cambodians

The military component of UNTAC will provide assistance as necessary in the repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons carried out in accordance with Articles 19 and 20 of this Agreement, in particular in the clearing of mines from repatriation routes, reception centres and resettlement areas, as well as in the protection of the reception centres.

Annex 3 Elections

1. The constituent assembly referred to in Article 12 of the Agreement shall consist of 120 members. Within three months from the date of the election, it shall complete its tasks of drafting and adopting a new Cambodian Constitution and transform itself into a legislative assembly which will form a new Cambodian Government.
2. The election referred to in Article 12 of the Agreement will be held throughout Cambodia on a provincial basis in accordance with a system of proportional representation on the basis of lists of candidates put forward by political parties.
3. All Cambodians, including those who at the time of signature of this Agreement are Cambodian refugees and displaced persons, will have the same rights, freedoms and opportunities to take part in the electoral process.
4. Every person who has reached the age of eighteen at the time of application to register; or who turns eighteen during the registration period, and who either was born in Cambodia or is the child of a person born in Cambodia, will be eligible to vote in the election.
5. Political parties may be formed by any group of five thousand registered voters. Party platforms shall be consistent with the principles and objectives of the Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement.
6. Party affiliation will be required in order to stand for election to the constituent assembly. Political parties will present lists of candidates standing for election on their behalf, who will be registered voters.
7. Political parties and candidates will be registered in order to stand for election. UNTAC will confirm that political parties and candidates meet the established criteria in order to qualify for participation in the election. Adherence to a Code of Conduct established by UNTAC in consultation with the SNC will be a condition for such participation.
8. Voting will be by secret ballot, with provision made to assist those who are disabled or who cannot read or write.
9. The freedoms of speech, assembly and movement will be fully respected. All registered political parties will enjoy fair access to the media, including the press, television and radio.

Annex 4 Repatriation of Cambodian Refugees and Displaced Persons

Part I Introduction

1. As part of the comprehensive political settlement, every assistance will need to be given to Cambodian refugees and displaced persons as well as to countries of temporary refuge and the country of origin in order to facilitate the voluntary return of all Cambodian refugees and displaced persons in a peaceful and orderly manner. It must also be ensured that there would be no residual problems for the countries of temporary refuge. The country of origin with responsibility towards its own people will accept their return as conditions become conducive.

Part II Conditions Conducive to the Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons

• The task of rebuilding the Cambodian nation will require the harnessing of all its human and natural resources. To this end, the return to the place of their choice of Cambodians from their temporary refuge and elsewhere outside their country of origin will make a major contribution.

• Every effort should be made to ensure that the conditions which have led to a large number of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons seeking refuge in other countries should not recur. Nevertheless, some Cambodian refugees and displaced persons will wish and be able to return spontaneously to their homeland.
• There must be full respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Cambodians, including those of the repatriated refugees and displaced persons, in recognition of their entitlement to live in peace and security, free from intimidation and coercion of any kind. These rights would include, inter alia, freedom of movement within Cambodia, the choice of domicile and employment, and the right to property.
• In accordance with the comprehensive political settlement, every effort should be made to create concurrently in Cambodia political, economic and social conditions conducive to the return and harmonious integration of the Cambodian refugees and displaced persons.
• With a view to ensuring that refugees and displaced persons participate in the elections, mass repatriation should commence and be completed as soon as possible, taking into account all the political, humanitarian, logistical, technical and socio-economic factors involved, and with the co-operation of the SNC.
• Repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons should be voluntary and their decision should be taken in full possession of the facts. Choice of destination within Cambodia should be that of the individual. The unity of the family must be preserved.

Part III Operational Factors

8. Consistent with respect for principles of national sovereignty in the countries of temporary refuge and origin, and in close co-operation with the countries of temporary refuge and origin, full access by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), CRC and other relevant international agencies should be guaranteed to all Cambodian refugees and displaced persons, with a view to the agencies undertaking the census, tracing, medical assistance, food distribution and other activities vital to the discharge of their mandate and operational responsibilities; such access should also be provided in Cambodia to enable the relevant international organisations to carry out their traditional monitoring as well as operational responsibilities.
9. In the context of the comprehensive political settlement, the Signatories note with satisfaction that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has entrusted UNHCR with the role of leadership and co-ordination among intergovernmental agencies assisting with the repatriation and relief of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons. The Signatories look to all non-governmental organisations to co-ordinate as much as possible their work for the Cambodian refugees and displaced persons with that of UNHCR.
10. The SNC, the Governments of the countries in which the Cambodian refugees and displaced persons have sought temporary refuge, and the countries which contribute to the repatriation and integration effort will wish to monitor closely and facilitate the repatriation of the returnees. An ad hoc consultative body should be established for a limited term for these purposes. The UNHCR, the ICRC, and other international agencies as appropriate, as well as UNTAC, would be invited to join as full participants.
11. Adequately monitored short-term repatriation assistance should be provided on an impartial basis to enable the families and individuals returning to Cambodia to establish their lives and livelihoods harmoniously in their society. These interim measures would be phased out and replaced in the longer term by the reconstruction programme.
12. Those responsible for organising and supervising the repatriation operation will need to ensure that conditions of security are created for the movement of the refugees and displaced persons. In this respect, it is imperative that appropriate border crossing points and routes be designated and cleared of mines and other hazards.
13. The international community should contribute generously to the financial requirements of the repatriation operation.

Annex 5 Principles for a New Constitution for Cambodia

1. The constitution will be the supreme law of the land. It may be amended only by a designated process involving legislative approval, popular referendum, or both.
2. Cambodia's tragic recent history requires special measures to assure protection of human rights. Therefore, the constitution will contain a declaration of fundamental rights, including the rights to life, personal liberty, security, freedom of movement, freedom of religion, assembly and association including political parties and trade unions, due process and equality before the law, protection from arbitrary deprivation of property or deprivation of private property without just compensation, and freedom from racial, ethnic, religious or sexual discrimination. It will prohibit the retroactive application of criminal law. The declaration will be consistent with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international instruments. Aggrieved individuals will be entitled to have the courts adjudicate and enforce these rights.
3. The constitution will declare Cambodia's status as a sovereign, independent and neutral State, and the national unity of Cambodian people.
4. The constitution will state that Cambodia will follow a system of liberal democracy, on the basis of pluralism. It will provide for periodic and genuine elections. It will provide for the right to vote and to be elected by universal and equal suffrage. It will provide for voting by secret ballot, with a requirement that electoral procedures provide a full and fair opportunity to organise and participate in the electoral process.
5. An independent judiciary will be established, empowered to enforce the rights provided under the constitution.
6. The constitution will be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the constituent assembly.

Labels: 1991 Paris Peace Accords, Paris Peace Agreement

By Simon Taylor , of Global Witness.

Today marks the anniversary of the 1991 Paris Peace Accords - the agreement which signalled the beginning of the end of decades of violent conflict in Cambodia and the start of the biggest and most costly peacekeeping operation in history. Yet 16 years later, the country once regarded as the international poster-boy for post-conflict nation building is fast becoming South-East Asia's newest kleptocracy; its reputation marred by allegations of massive corruption, impunity, human rights abuses, and repressive, undemocratic governance. The international community - whose money has bankrolled this shattered state's rehabilitation - has singularly failed to stop the rot. Lessons must be learned if other fragile states are to avoid a similarly disastrous outcome.

On paper, Cambodia's natural resources and state assets - the land, forests, minerals and heritage sites - were the basis for kickstarting the post-conflict economy. The revenue generated should have gone towards poverty alleviation and rebuilding infrastructure. Instead, systematic and institutionalised corruption has deprived the entire population of the revenue that could have come from these public goods.

A cursory glance at today's Cambodian business sector reveals the country's forests, land, mining, ports, national buildings and casinos to be predominantly controlled by a handful of government-affiliated tycoons or family members of senior political figures. Information about deals is not made available to the Cambodian people to whom the state's resources belong. Similarly, consultation with local populations dependent upon forests or land is often non-existent. For many Cambodians, the first they know is the sound of a chainsaw revving or a bulldozer arriving to flatten their crops.

Cambodia's forests are a case in point. In the 1990s they were described by the World Bank as the country's "most developmentally important resource". Today they are largely degraded, having been sold off over the years by the political elite to private companies or individuals intent on logging as much as possible to turn a quick buck. Most of the vast wealth generated has not reached the national coffers: instead it appears to have been siphoned off into the private bank accounts of the loggers and their political patrons.

While a booming textile and tourism industry has resulted in double-digit economic growth in recent years, the reality is that Cambodians are still among the world's poorest people and wealth inequality is increasing. With an estimated 35% of the population living below the poverty line, and the vast majority without electricity or mains water, survival remains a challenge for millions. Meanwhile, government-sanctioned forced evictions and land grabs are rife, human rights violations are common, corruption is endemic and impunity is the norm. Over the past five years, this has been accompanied by a backward-slide in space for civil society and political opposition to operate, resulting in a governance system recently described by the UN rapporteur on human rights as "a shaky facade of democracy".

Cambodia's donors have provided the equivalent of over 50% of the government's annual budget for over a decade now. Having spent billions of dollars in setting up a democratic system in Cambodia, one would assume that donors and their domestic tax payers have an interest in preserving it. Yet the international donor community has consistently failed to bring the government to book for blatant violations of its commitments to protect human rights, fight corruption, and ensure the protection of natural resources. In the 1990s, turning a blind eye was justified by the need to ensure "stability". From stability would flow economic development, and from economic development would flow political pluralism. The past 16 years have revealed the impotence of such logic. With each successive failure of the donor community to deal with the regime's failure to honour commitments to good governance, those responsible have increased their wealth and impunity. The end result is that Cambodians find it harder and harder to call their government to account.

It is not too late for the international community to redefine its terms of engagement with Cambodia, but it will require a fundamental shift in mindset. At its core must be a recognition that stripping a country of its assets for personal gain represents a mass violation of the social and economic rights of its people. Next, donors must impose sanctions on those who they believe are corruptly profiteering from the exploitation of the state's resources. These measures should include a freeze on all assets, restrictions on international travel and a ban on doing business with nationals of the donor country.

This will be a bitter pill to swallow for those donors who would prefer to enjoy an amicable relationship with the Cambodian government. Yet, if the international community cannot get it right in a small and relatively non-strategic country such as Cambodia, what hope for the likes of Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo? To continue to give overseas aid without the courage to tackle blatant mass corruption and poor governance is the equivalent of pouring good money after bad. Worse, it confers a badge of approval and reinforces the legitimacy of a government which is not acting in the interests of its own population. Cambodia and its people deserve better.

Labels: 1991 Paris Peace Accords, Global Witness

Labels: 16th Anniversary, 1991 Paris Peace Accords, CFC, Vietnamese influence, Vietnamese interference, Vietnamization of Cambodia