Editorial | Articles about Cambodia | Khmer
PHNOM PENH,Cambodia- China's Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), on Wednesday officially opened its branch in Phnom Penh, aimed at cementing Sino-Cambodia economic and trade cooperation.
The ICBC Phnom Penh Branch is the second Chinese bank operating in Cambodia after the first one--Bank of China-- launched here in May. The bank is the kingdom's 30th commercial banks.
Speaking at the launching, the ICBC Board Chairman Jiang Jianqing said the establishment of the branch in Cambodia was not only an embodiment of ICBC's confidence in the future economic development of Cambodia, but also showed the bank's commitment to bridge Sino-Cambodia economic and trade cooperation.
"China and Cambodia have long benefited from a friendly, sincere, trustworthy and win-win partnership," he said. "The closer economic and trade cooperation between the two countries has provided wide space for ICBC's development in Cambodia."
He said the bank will reinforce its cooperation with Chinese enterprises in Cambodia and support the infrastructure development in fields like communication, transportation and electricity.
It will also extend its financial service to traditionally advantageous local industries such as grain and tourism and provide quality and convenient comprehensive financial service to indigenous enterprises and individual customers, he said.
At the meantime, Cambodia's Deputy Prime Minister Keat Chhon, minister of economy and finance, said the presence of the bank would build more public confidence in Cambodia's banking industry.
"It's great honor for Cambodia that the World No 1 class bank launches here," he said at the bank's launching.
He asked the bank to focus its loans on agricultural sector, especially rice sector, in order to help the government of Cambodia to achieve the target of exporting 1 million tons of milled rice in 2015.
Chea Chanto, governor of the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC), said the bank's presence would help attract more Chinese investors to Cambodia.
"The bank is vital to contribute to the development of Cambodia's economy," he said. "I believe that the bank would bring new technology and innovative banking products to develop Cambodian banking industry."
By the end of September this year, the customers' deposits in the banking sector grew by 17 percent to $4.72 billion, while the customer credits increased by 23 percent to $4.04 billion, according to the NBC's reports.
So far, some 1.43 million people have their money deposited at Cambodia's banks, while about 1.3 million people have borrowed money from the banks, Chea Chanto added.
During the launch, Pan Guangxue, the Chinese Ambassador to Cambodia, also expressed congratulation to the ICBC for opening the first branch in Cambodia.
"The bank will contribute to the development of economic and trade ties between China and Cambodia," he said.
He added that the bilateral trade volume between China and Cambodia had reached $1.6 billion in the first nine months of this year, an increase of 57.5 percent.
On the investment side, from 1994 to September this year, there have been nearly 400 Chinese investment projects in Cambodia with the accumulative investment of nearly $9 billion, making China the largest investor in Cambodia.
ICBC is the largest bank of China's big four state-owned commercial banks. It is ranked top among all listed banks in the world in terms of its market value, profitability, customers' deposit and brand value, according to the bank's press release.
By the end of this September, it has established 234 institutions in 31 foreign countries and regions, forming a global service platform covering the major international financial centers and China's economic and trade partners.
Labels: China, Commercial Bank of China
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by Brendan Brady | MACLEAN.CA
With per capita GDP well under a thousand dollars and a government dependent on foreign aid, Cambodia is among the poorest of the poor in Southeast Asia. But with workers in China, Thailand and Vietnam, demanding and obtaining heftier paychecks, Cambodians are getting a residual lift. Rising wages, labour unrest, as well as currency instability and political turmoil in some cases, elsewhere in the region’s traditional manufacturing centers are improving the prospects of Cambodia, an industrial minnow.
The country’s garment exports have soared in the past year, increasing by nearly 40 per cent, according to the government. Independent observers might put the figure lower, but they would agree with Ken Loo, the secretary general of the Garment Manufacturers Association of Cambodia, when he points to rising wages and work stoppages in China as one of the main causes of Cambodia’s increased share of the market. It’s an important boost in a sector that has been Cambodia’s main engine of growth since the late 1990s, when the country stabilized after years of debilitating civil strife. The garment and footwear industry employs some 400,000 people in this country of just over 14 million (the Gap, H&M and Nike are among the major brands that have suppliers in Cambodia) and account for more than two-thirds of Cambodia’s exports.
But the spillover effects of higher labour costs in China and elsewhere aren’t limited to the textiles sector. Slowly but surely, Cambodia’s industrial horizons are expanding as well, with Japanese companies leading the charge. Minebea, a Tokyo-based producer of micro motors, for example, started operations in Cambodia at the end of last year. The Japanese company began outsourcing manufacturing to Thailand 25 years ago, where it has grown to employ over 30,000 workers. Because of rising wages there, it’s now assembling some of its products in a special economic zone in Phnom Penh, Cambodia’s capital. Other manufacturers—making headphones and wetsuits, among other products—have opened plants there too, lifting the sophistication of the Cambodian manufacturing sector above T-shirts and sneakers.
“It’s unrealistic to say Cambodia is adding huge value-added chains,” said Peter Brimble, chief economist of the Asian Development Bank in Cambodia. But growing hurdles in Asia’s main production centers are “enough to tip the scales” to attract investor interest in Cambodia. Gordon Peters, an investment adviser with Emerging Markets Consulting, which operates in Southeast Asia, said the number of international companies contacting his consulting firm about business scoping opportunities in Cambodia has grown exponentially this year. More investors are looking at Cambodia as an attractive “long-term bet,” one with limited dividends now but high-growth prospects in the near future, he said.
Observers often criticize the heavy-handed influence of Beijing on Cambodia. But if rising wages in the regional powerhouse can lift business and employment prospects in Cambodia, this is a spell under China’s shadow that the Southeast Asian country is likely to enjoy.
Brendan Brady (www.brendanbrady.com) reports widely on diplomacy, business, human rights and environmental issues across the Asia-Pacific.
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Liao Ruo |chinadialogue
Where rule of law is weak, China’s investors should be wary of hiding behind local regulations, writes Liao Ruo, concluding a two-part article.
Perhaps concerned about the negative impact of the “relocations” from Boeung Kak, the commercial attaché at China’s embassy in Cambodia, counsellor Jin Yuan, gave an interview to the Global Times in January, rejecting responsibility on behalf of the Chinese firm. Shukaku bore sole responsibility for the relocations and Erdos Hongjun would only be involved after that process finished, he said, adding that compensation negotiations were being carried out by a special body appointed by the Phnom Penh government and had nothing to do with either company.
Admittedly, according to its contract, the Chinese company isn’t legally responsible for the relocations. But as a 50% shareholder in the joint venture and the project’s sole investor, doesn’t it have a social responsibility to the thousands of residents whose lives have been gravely affected by the scheme?
The Global Times report also stated that “Even though the residents’ buildings are mostly illegal, the development company has still paid out compensation and built alternative housing 20 kilometres outside of Phnom Penh.” The implication is that the residents’ demands are illegitimate, the developers have already done more than necessary and the Boeung Kak locals have no cause to bother the Chinese firm.
But in Cambodia, where the rule of law is weak, legality and justice may not always be one and the same. If you want to be a good investor, you have to make an effort to understand local realities, as well as obeying local rules.
Originally, the banks of Boeung Kak were uninhabited. But after the fall of the Khmer Rouge in the 1980s, Cambodians started to move back to Phnom Penh from the surrounding provinces and some settled here. In 2001, a new land law was passed: if a household could prove that it had lived in one place for the five years prior to 2001, then it owned the property.
Most of the residents around Boeung Kak meet that requirement. But the government has made slow progress certifying land rights, and so their ownership remains unrecognised. After the city government announced the leasing of land to Shukaku in February 2007, the locals started to fear they would sooner or later be driven away – and sure enough, the following year, government promises that locals would not be moved were broken, and pressure started to be applied. The nightmare began.
As the Global Times reported, the developers did provide compensation. Residents were given three choices: US$8,500 in cash; a new home 20 kilometres away from the city and US$500 for moving costs; or temporarily relocation to another site with the option of moving back in five years.
That may sound adequate, but it’s not. Land in the area already costs US$3,000 per square metre. Assuming each household originally had 50 square metres of land, it would have had a market value of US$150,000. And so $8,500 is far from a fair price.
The majority of the displaced residents had no choice but to head to the city’s outskirts and “spend about US$6,000 on a piece of land, and then another three or four thousand dollars building a house,” Sia Phearum, secretariat director of Housing Rights Task Force, a Phnom Penh-based NGO, told reporters. They couldn’t buy land in the city proper for two reasons, he said: one, it is too expensive, and, two, they would only be likely to be relocated again.
Unlike in Chinese cities, Phnom Penh does not have lots of residential property developments, and those that do exist are not built for ordinary people. If the average local wants a house, he or she “buys” a piece of land and builds on it. However, that “buying” normally means obtaining a proof of exchange from the village or county head, which has no legal force. If the government decides it wants the land, that piece of paper is not enough to prove ownership. Of course, residents can go through the proper formalities and have their land rights recognised, but that can cost US$1,500 in bribes to the authorities – more than an ordinary worker might make in a year.
The second option is no better. In early 2010, I visited the replacement housing provided to relocated locals by the developer: rows of single-storey buildings. Inside each house is just a large empty room. There are no kitchens, and the toilets are outside. Basic infrastructure is inadequate.
Most importantly, it’s too far from the city. Cambodia is not a developed nation, and leaving the city means going back to an agricultural society, away from modern infrastructure like electricity and running water. It can also mean losing your livelihood: Phearum said 60% of those who moved here ended up returning to the city and renting somewhere to live.
Moving has also caused employment and education difficulties. The women can no longer earn their usual income setting up small stalls by their front doors, as the area has very few residents – and those who do live here have no money to spend. Many of the men tend to work as motorcycle taxi drivers and this has problems too: it’s a 50 kilometre round-trip to the city, which means spending a lot more on fuel. There’s no nearby school, so some children dropped out. One middle school student told me that he’d missed a year of education, until an NGO gave him a bicycle so he could get to a school 20 kilometres away.
The third option, to move back to Boeung Kak in five years, is even less popular. The developers are promising apartments in high-rise buildings, meaning residents will not be able to run stalls at their front door. The community also has no confidence that the developer will keep its promises.
And so the remaining 800 residents are refusing all three proposals and demanding land where they can build homes near the lake. The developer can continue to say its compensation schemes are more than fair, but in reality the residents have been placed in a hopeless situation.
How did this project attract two or three different Chinese firms, and how can those firms ignore the pleas of the locals? Perhaps it has something to do with who the Cambodian partner is.
Shukaku’s chairman is senator Lao Meng Khin of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party, and a special adviser to prime minister Hun Sen. He is also ethnically Chinese, and always accompanies the prime minister on visits to China. In 2009, Khin was invited to Beijing for the 60th anniversary celebrations of the People’s Republic of China. He is often found lurking in the shadows of large Sino-Cambodian joint ventures.
In March 2004, Cambodian International Investment Development Group (CIIDG) – of which Lao Meng Khin is also chairman – signed a deal with China’s Henan Jinqu Gold, forming Jinqu Mining, to extract gold ore in Cambodia. In November 2004, he imported a train from China South Locomotive and Rolling Stock, the first such purchase from China made by Cambodia. And, in February 2008, a consortium of four Chinese firms, led by the Jiangsu Hodo Group, invested in a special economic zone in Sihankouville, again in partnership with CIIDG.
An investigation by United Kingdom-based NGO Global Witness has found that Lao Meng Khin is also a director of a forestry company that cooperates with Chinese logging business Hainan Wuzhishan Group, and of two more firms which, judging by their names, are likely China-Cambodia joint ventures: Petrol Camchin and Sino Hydropower.
Clearly, he has excellent contacts with the authorities in charge of various resources. Global Witness estimates that Lao Meng Khin and his wife’s company, Pheapimex, has felling rights to 1.33 million hectares of forest – 7.4% of Cambodia’s total land area. According to a US embassy cable released by Wikileaks, Pheapimex has recently obtained usage rights for 315,000 hectares of land for plantations and mining.
Having such a well-placed Cambodian partner may ease the worries of many Chinese investors. But high political benefits also bring high political risks. On September 11 this year, Cambodia’s main opposition party, the Sam Rainsy Party, issued a statement describing Shukaku as “an enemy of the Khmer people”. It warned all law-abiding companies and organisations to avoid any connection with the company, including owning its shares, making joint investments, loans, guarantees, purchasing or supplying products or services or cooperating in any way. Although the governing Cambodian People’s Party still has a strong grip on power and the Sam Rainsy Party is very likely to remain in opposition for the foreseeable future, its rhetoric and the public opinion it represents must be taken seriously.
Liao Ruo is a reporter based in Beijing.
Labels: Boeung Kak Lake, China, eviction, Lao Meng Khin, Shukaku, Yeay Phu
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USA TODAY
By Calum MacLeod,
Still under construction, the 66-story-high Xiaowan dam is scheduled to be completed this year. Other countries accuse China of stealing water.
Imaginechina via AP
XIAOWAN, China — Wearing cloaks of tree bark strands, villagers from the Yi ethnic minority tend wheat terraces that cascade downhill toward the riverbank.
It is a scene unchanged for centuries, and it takes place in the shadow of a modern wall of concrete as high as a 66-story skyscraper that fills a gorge of the Lancang River in remote southwestern China.
The Xiaowan dam in the hills of Yunnan province is one of eight hydroelectric projects that will bring China?s industrial revolution to the impoverished region. It is by far the biggest of the four dams built so far that when done this year will be the biggest arch dam in the world.
But not all of the water is China's. The downstream half of the 2,700-mile-long river winds through Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, where it is known as the Mekong.
In those countries, 60 million people rely on the Mekong not for electricity but for food, water and transport. They say the Chinese dams have reduced the river to its lowest levels in 50 years, and environmental groups accuse China of reducing the river flow downstream.
"Many local people and groups that monitor the dams in China point the finger at the dams as one of the main causes of the drying up of the river," says Srisuwan Kuankachorn, co-director of Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance, a Thailand-based environmental group.
Srisuwan says the countries are in a drought caused by China that has killed fisheries, withered croplands and dried up waterway transportation routes.
And the problems are likely to get worse with the completion of the Xiaowan dam. A United Nations report issued in May 2009 warned that China's eight planned dams, of which Xiaowan is the fourth, "may pose the single greatest threat to the river."
"The capability of the new dam is much bigger than the other three combined," Srisuwan says.
Little leverage for compliance
At the plush local offices of dam builders Huaneng Hydrolancang, senior engineer Zhao Meng is unruffled by the dire allegations. Zhao, 58, bears a scientist's conviction that the doubters are wrong.
"However much water arrives, the same amount will leave," Zhao says. "We have no plan to keep the water or use it elsewhere. We will store water for a while as we fill the reservoir (currently 30% full), but this dam will not affect the water flow downstream."
Some regional experts agree that the hydroelectric projects are unrelated to the drought.
"China's dams have not caused this problem," says Jeremy Bird, CEO of the Mekong River Commission, an organization that helps manage the river's resources for Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam.
But China's refusal to provide data to the commission on the dams already is raising suspicions among analysts. This month, a Chinese delegation to the commission promised deeper cooperation but stopped short of adding to a promise to provide hydrological data for two smaller Yunnan dams.
"The Chinese must come clean on how much water they are diverting at Xiaowan and, in the future, at Nuozhadu," another dam that will boast an even bigger reservoir, says Alan Potkin, a development specialist at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Northern Illinois University.
Xiaowan is "an enormously large dam, bigger than anything in North America," says Potkin, who worries that in two years' time both Xiaowan and Nuozhadu could be filling reservoirs simultaneously. Potkin is urging the commission to ask China for the most critical data. But he knows the board can do little if China refuses. "It has very little leverage at all," he says.
Journalists have been kept at bay at Xiaowan. A USA TODAY reporter was held up by police for three hours while trying to get to the site and then refused entry.
Local residents dispute that the drought stems from natural causes.
Here in Yunnan province, White Fish Pond hasn't seen fish for years, says Bi Xiuxian, who heads a small hydropower station on the Weishan River. For the past half-year, the river has hardly seen any water, either. So the privately owned power plant in the village of Lishimo is idle.
"Poor management of water facilities is definitely a major reason for this drought," complains Bi, an ethnic Yi. "We need new wells, better management of old wells, and more maintenance of water canals."
Elders pray for rain
China's thirst for energy will likely keep the projects moving forward without much look back, say activists.
"We need time to see the real results," says Wang Yongchen, founder of Green Earth Volunteers, an environmental group, who has monitored China's dam-building for several years. "China is developing so quickly and needs a lot of energy, but nature is not just for humans."
In Shuanghe village, Nanjian County, Yunnan province, farmer Xu Piqing stands on a bridge above the now-dry water canal that usually rushes into the Weishan River.
"We should be busy now, harvesting corn and beans, but instead we have nothing to do," says Xu, 43.
Some villagers are taking action, though.
This month, more than 100 elders will gather to pray for rain on the hilltop, lighting incense and kowtowing to the earth. It's an annual ritual, but "this year will be the biggest ever," Xu says.
Labels: China, Mekong
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China Ascendant – Part I
Bertil Lintner - 4/29/2008
Source: Global Politicians
China, which Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen referred to as “the root of everything that was evil in Cambodia” in a 1988 essay, has emerged as a major donor to Cambodia and, unlike aid from the West, Chinese assistance comes with no strings attached for promoting democracy or good governance. China is also a major investor in Cambodia, mainly in the garment industry, but also in agriculture, mining, hotels and tourism.
The Chinese are coming. If the plan holds, the small and sleepy capital of Laos, Vientiane, might look like Manhattan on the Mekong. More than architectural statement, the construction of the new Chinatown in Laos will mark the newest evidence of China’s rising influence in Indochina, once the playpen of Vietnam.
An artist’s impression in state-owned media shows the shape of new development that will turn marshland into a modern city, populated by an estimated 50,000 migrants from China. The Associated Press reports that a Chinese company leased the land.
China’s profile and influence in Laos have grown steadily over the past few years at the expense of the landlocked country’s longstanding friendship with Vietnam. Similar development has taken place in Cambodia, another close ally of China’s longtime rival in the region, Vietnam. China, which Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen referred to as “the root of everything that was evil in Cambodia” in a 1988 essay, has emerged as a major donor to Cambodia and, unlike aid from the West, Chinese assistance comes with no strings attached for promoting democracy or good governance. China is also a major investor in Cambodia, mainly in the garment industry, but also in agriculture, mining, hotels and tourism.
This development has not gone unnoticed in Vietnam. In the case of Laos, to alleviate fears of a shift in foreign allegiances, the official media have over the past year protested a bit too much about the traditional friendship with Hanoi, repeatedly mentioning the 1977 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the two communist-ruled countries. Symbolically, a stylistic painting showing Lao and Vietnamese soldiers and civilians linking arms under national flags won first prize in a Vientiane art competition 19 September 2007, the 20th anniversary of the treaty’s signing. On Lao television, Lao and Vietnamese dignitaries meet and proclaim the “everlasting friendship” between the two countries.
But Laos’ allegiances have changed and that’s reflected in the history of three apartment blocks on the road to Vientiane’s Wattay Airport. Built in the early 1970s to accommodate operatives of the US Central Intelligence Agency and other American advisers, the buildings were taken over by Soviet technicians when the communist Pathet Lao took over in 1975. Today, the Mekong Hotel and Apartments cater to a mainly Chinese clientele, with one floor housing the Beijing Restaurant.
The number of Chinese working in Laos has increased in recent years. According to official statistics, about 30,000 Chinese now live in Laos, but the real figure could be 10 times greater. Thousands of Chinese work on the Asian Development Bank–funded Route 3 that runs from Boten, on the border with the southern Chinese province of Yunnan, through Luang Nam Tha in Laos, down to the Mekong River at the Houei Xay ferry crossing opposite Chiang Khong in Thailand, where a bridge is planned as well. When finished, the highway – and Laos – will be China’s main overland connection with Southeast Asia.
At the same time, China has become a major investor in Laos with 236 projects worth around US$876 million, a considerable increase from US$3 million worth of investment in 1996. The total Chinese direct investment approved by Laos’ Committee for Planning and Investment up to August 2007 amounts to US$1.1 billion, second only to Thailand’s projects worth US$1.3 billion. About a third of the Chinese investment is in hydropower, and the Laos government has granted Chinese companies concessions to mine gold, copper, iron, potassium and bauxite. Vast tracts of land have been farmed out to Chinese interests for rubber plantations.
China’s assistance to Laos since the late 1990s has reached nearly US$500 million in grants, interest-free loans and special loans. China has built a huge Culture Hall in Vientiane, ostensibly in traditional Lao style. In November 2004, China beautified the park around the Vientiane landmark Patouxay, the capital’s Arch of Triumph, and now constructs a stadium for the Southeast Asian Games, which Laos will host in 2009.
According to a June 2007 report in the English-language Vientiane Times, special loans from China helped establish the Lao Telecom Company and Lao Asia Telecom, and also funded a cement factory, the purchase of two MA 60 aircraft for Lao Airlines, as well as several government internet projects. The Chinese ambassador in Vientiane participates in donors’ meetings and plays an active role in the social life of Lao-based diplomats. Soon he’ll be joined by thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of Chinese citizens in Vientiane’s new Chinatown, which, for reasons of sensitivity, is called a “New City Development Project.”
In Cambodia – where China once supported the dreaded Khmer Rouge regime both when it was in power and later as a resistance force against the regime that Vietnam installed in Phnom Penh in January 1979 – the political situation began to change when Hun Sen ousted his then coalition partner, royalist leader Prince Norodom Ranariddh, in a June 1997 coup. Cambodia’s Western donors were not amused: The US and Germany suspended non-humanitarian aid until a free and fair election was held. Japan, Cambodia’s largest donor, said it would halt new projects.
But China came to Hun Sen’s rescue. Longtime Cambodia watcher Julio Jeldres notes that China was the first country to recognize the regime after the coup; in December that year, Beijing delivered 116 military cargo trucks and 70 jeeps valued at US$2.8 million. In February 1999, Hun Sen paid an official visit to China and obtained US$200 million in interest-free loans and US$18.3 million in foreign-assistance guarantees. The number of Chinese settlers in Cambodia is unknown, but estimated to be in the thousands.
The “new” Chinese, who for various reasons have settled in countries such as Cambodia and Laos, are more assertive than older Chinese communities in the region. According to Andrew Forbes, a Thailand-based China expert who spent more than 20 years studying China’s relations with Southeast Asia: “They’ve grown up in a country which is stronger and far more unified than before. There’s a new sense of being Chinese: the new migrants are patriotic and loyal to the motherland.”
This sense of national pride provokes tensions between new-generation migrants and older settlers, who fear the newcomers’ outward display of nationalism could rekindle longstanding suspicions towards ethnic Chinese communities in their adopted countries.
There have been incidents of anti-Chinese hostility that bear out those concerns. For example, in May 1999, 300 “new” Chinese massed outside the US embassy in the Cambodian capital Phnom Penh to protest the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. A smaller gathering of ethnic Chinese Cambodians, in the country for generations, held a counterdemonstration, heckling the protesters: “You’re not our brothers,” one yelled, referring to the suffering of Cambodia’s Chinese during the 1975-79 Khmer Rouge regime. “Your people killed my people during Pol Pot’s time.”
But the Vietnamese have greater reason to fear China’s rising economic, political and demographic clout in the region. Vietnam, once a leading force in Indochina, is becoming isolated from traditional allies. It still retains some influence in Laos, and trade between the two countries is not insignificant. But once Vientiane’s new Chinatown is built, that may change and the people of Laos have to adjust to their country’s becoming an extension of Yunnan.Labels: China, hun sen
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The New York Review of Books has a long article this week on China’s support of Cambodia, written by a longtime foreign correspondent for the French newspaper Le Figaro. The article by Francois Hauter is behind this pay wall, but here is the opening paragraph, an excerpt and the surprising ending:
In Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia, the economy is going strong, but the prime minister, Hun Sen, has organized the plunder of the nation's resources for the benefit of its powerful neighbor, China, in exchange for Beijing's protection.
….
Cambodia was on its last legs when the Vietnamese invaded in December 1978, and they installed the new government dominated by Hun Sen, who became prime minister in 1985. A consummate survivor, he is still prime minister twenty-two years later. He did everything he could to prevent the public trial of Khmer Rouge leaders demanded by the United Nations. Why? Because although he had been placed in power by the Vietnamese, he had long since transferred his allegiance to the Chinese government, which had been the chief patron of the Khmer Rouge regime, supplying it with arms, food, training, and international backing. To put the Khmer Rouge leaders on trial would have been to denounce Chinese collaboration in the Khmer genocide. It would also have compromised certain tangible interests. "China is a very great country," Hun Sen declared recently. “If 1.3 billion Chinese were all to urinate at the same time, it would unleash a major flood. But China's leaders are doing good things with their partners.... When China gives, there are no strings attached. You can do what you want with the money.”
The Cambodian leaders did not fail to take advantage of the opportunity. State assets were sold off to the highest bidder. One scholar, François Mangin, has estimated that between 1993 and 1999, the Cambodian government sold concessions to more than a third of Cambodia's most productive land, mainly to foreign companies engaged in commercial exploitation of forests, mineral resources, agriculture, fisheries, and tourism.
To cite just one example: Pheapimex and Wuzishan, two companies run by the best friend of Hun Sen's wife, were given rights to develop and exploit more than 1.26 million acres of forest with logistical support from Chinese firms.
The proceeds from land confiscation which primarily involves the pillage of Cambodian forests for Chinese exploitation have been used to finance the prime minister's party and his security force, which is the only well-equipped military unit in the country (other brigades are employed in the transport of timber). Money acquired dishonestly is laundered in nine casinos now operating in Poipet, a town near the Thai border. Western governments and international aid organizations, including the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, are well aware of this phenomenal corruption.
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What seems to me more singular about Beijing's attitude toward Cambodia, however, is that Chinese officials have shown themselves unable to support "good" practices rather than "bad" ones. Hun Sen and his collaborators have long held Cambodia in their grip, and that has suited the Chinese Communists just fine. Beijing has also backed the despicable military government in Burma and the paranoid North Korean dictator. Whatever mad regime might serve China's interests, regardless of the suffering inflicted on the victims of those regimes, has been accepted, tolerated, and supported by the Chinese. Western diplomats have taken much satisfaction in denouncing their "cynicism."
But is it really cynicism? It is in the name of pragmatism that the Chinese do not allow moral considerations to weigh on their minds. Without any qualms, they adapt instantly to whatever situation they find, good and bad. This absolute pragmatism is the rule in the private sphere as well as for public affairs. I am reminded of what a Chinese friend told me when I expressed my exasperation at this failure to distinguish between good and evil. She answered: "My father told me, 'Be good, but not too good, or else you will die, for your place will be in Heaven, not on earth. And don't be too bad, either, or you won't deserve your place on earth." Had the balloon seller said the same thing, it might have mitigated my rage against Hun Sen's clique.
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China Rises is written by Tim Johnson, the Beijing bureau chief for McClatchy Newspapers. He covers both China and Taiwan.
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